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Abstract. This paper reasserts the fundamental conceptual distinction between language-
particular categories of individual languages, defined within particular systems, and 
comparative concepts at the cross-linguistic level, defined in substantive terms. The paper 
argues that comparative concepts are also widely used in other sciences, and that they are 
always distinct from social categories, of which linguistic categories are special instances. 
Some linguists (especially in the generative tradition) assume that linguistic categories are 
natural kinds (like biological species, or chemical elements) and thus need not be defined, 
but can be recognized by their symptoms, which may be different in different languages. I 
also note that category-like comparative concepts are sometimes very similar to categories, 
and that different languages may sometimes be described in a unitary commensurable 
mode, thus blurring (but not questioning) the distinction. Finally, I note that cross-
linguistic claims must be interpreted as being about the facts of languages, not about the 




To make lasting progress in linguistics, we need cumulative research results and 
replicability of each other’s claims. Cumulativity and replicability are not often 
emphasized by linguists, and one of the reasons why these seem difficult is that often we 
cannot even agree what we mean by our technical terms. Often this seems to be because 
we do not distinguish clearly enough between descriptive categories of individual 
languages and comparative concepts for cross-linguistic studies. We routinely use the 
same terms for both (e.g. ergative, or relative clause, or optative mood), but I have argued 
that we cannot equate the two kinds of concepts (Haspelmath 2010). 
 The first published critique of my 2010 proposal was van der Auwera & Sahoo 
(2015), but in the meantime, several further articles discussing this methodological 
distinction have appeared (especially the papers collected by Plank 2016 and Lehmann 
2016). I will use the opportunity of this paper to address a number of different points 
that have come up in the discussion of the issues over the last few years. 
 Overall, I have few disagreements with those linguists that work in a broadly Boasian 
and/or Greenbergian tradition. But it is clear that some of my claims SEEM controversial, 
so I hope that this paper will clarify a few issues. (I do have some real disagreements 
with linguists who assume innate cross-linguistic categories; see §6-7 below.) 
 In this paper, I provide further justification for the claim in (1), but in addition, I put 
special emphasis on the observation that the general category presumption is wrong for 
linguistics (see 2). 
 
(1)  (ontological difference) 
  Comparative concepts are a different kind of entity than descriptive categories  
  (cf. §5). 
 
	   2	  
(2) (general category fallacy) 
  We do not learn anything about particular languages  
  merely by observing that category A in language 1 is similar to category B  
  in language 2, or by putting both into the same general category C (cf. §6). 
 
For example, by saying that the Spanish-specific construction [estar V-ndo] ‘be V-ing’ is 
an instance of the general category “progressive”, we do not learn anything that goes 
beyond what we need to know for a description of this construction anyway. Thus, 
general categories do not by themselves advance our knowledge, although there are of 
course many ways in which information about another language or knowledge of cross-
linguistic patterns can help describers to identify all the properties of the construction. 
 This is worth emphasizing, because there is a constant temptation to think that 
subsuming a language-particular descriptive category under a general category does add 
information. We experience the usefulness of the general category presumption every 
day: When a young woman introduces a young man as her boyfriend, I can make certain 
further inferences how the two will behave which are usually very helpful for further 
interaction; and when I’m told that a certain kind of infusion is real tea (made from 
Camellia sinensis), I have different expectation concerning its effects than if it is a herbal 
tea made of chamomile. It is important to understand why this is a fallacy in 
comparative linguistics. 
 Briefly, the answer is that the cross-linguistic comparative concepts (like 
“progressive”) are not pre-established categories that exist independently of the 
comparison. Different languages represent historical accidents, and (unless they 
influenced each other via language contact) the categories of one language have no causal 
connection to the categories of another language. By contrast, the categories ‘boyfriend’ 
and Camellia sinensis do exist independently of particular circumstances, and of someone 
becomes a boyfriend or if a new tea plant arises, this is causally connected to the pre-
established category. 
 I will elaborate on this point later on, but first I discuss a number of different kinds 
of comparative concepts (§2). Subsequent sections will address a range of additional 
issues that have come up in the literature on comparative concepts and descriptive 
categories. 
 
2. Kinds of comparative concepts 
 
Comparative concepts can be divided into two main types: CATEGORY-LIKE comparative 
concepts and ETIC comparative concepts. 
 Category-like comparative concepts are the most difficult to deal with, but also the 
most familiar type of comparative concept. Some examples of category-like comparative 
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Table 1. Some category-like comparative concepts 
lateral consonant Maddieson (2005a) 
syllable Maddieson (2005b) 
reduplication Rubino (2005) 
subject, object, verb Dryer (2005) 
independent personal pronoun Siewierska (2005) 
adnominal demonstrative Diessel (2005) 
future tense Dahl & Velupillai (2005) 
applicative construction Polinsky (2005) 
‘hand’, ‘arm’ Brown (2005) 
 
Some of these are phonetically based (e.g. lateral consonant) or semantically based (e.g. 
‘hand’, ‘arm’). But most category-like comparative concepts which are familiar from 
typology are HYBRID comparative concepts (Croft 2016: 3), i.e. they include both 
semantic-functional aspects and formal aspects in their definition. For example, a future 
tense form is a verb form which includes a marker that indicates future time reference of 
the situation denoted by the verb. Crucially, the form must include a grammatical 
marker, i.e. a formally defined entitity,1 and this marker must occur on a particular class 
of roots (namely verb roots). The seven category-like comparative concepts defined in 
Haspelmath 2010: §5) are all of this type, as are the five concepts defined in Haspelmath 
(2009: §6). 
 Another type of category-like comparative concept is known by terms that are not 
derived from grammars of particular languages. For the typology of argument coding, 
the role-types S, A, P, T and R, along with the notion of alignment, have proven very 
useful (Haspelmath 2011a), and for the typology of subordination, Cristofaro (2003) 
makes extensive use of the notion of balanced subordination and deranked 
subordination. The abstract concepts of locus (head-marking and dependent-marking, 
Nichols 1992) and branching direction (Dryer 1992) have been important in typology, 
but need not play any role in particular languages. The notions of adpossessive 
construction (Haspelmath 2017) or existential construction (Creissels 2017) have also 
proven very useful, though many grammatical descriptions make no use of these notions. 
They are still category-like, but more removed from the concepts in Table 1. What is 
typical of these concepts is that they are defined more narrowly than the corresponding 
language-particular categories. For example, an adpossessive (= adnominal possessive) 
construction is defined as a construction that expresses kinship relations, part-whole 
relations, and/or ownership relations (cf. Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2003), but in individual 
languages, such constructions normally express other relations as well (e.g. my chair ‘the 
chair I am sitting on’, or your school ‘the school that you are attending’).2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A grammatical marker can be defined as a formative (or morph) that cannot occur on its own, but occurs 
in close association to a major-class root (or in second position of the clause), that cannot be focused, and 
that expresses an abstract meaning which may correspond to nothing in a translation to another language. 
2 Thus, I disagree with Lander & Arkadiev’s (2016: 404) statement that „if comparative concepts are not felt 
to be relevant for the grammars of different languages, they are usually not viable“. On the contrary: Many 
comparative concepts (e.g. all the etic ones) are not usable for language description, and conversely,  some of 
the well-known category-like concepts that are not viable as comparative concepts (see (8) in §8 below) 
work well in individual languages. 
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 But typologists also work with comparative concepts that are not category-like, but 
are meanings or functions, often of a type that would not be expected to be the meaning 
of a single form. In semantic-map studies, for example (e.g. Haspelmath 2003; van der 
Auwera & Temürcü 2006), the nodes on the map are meanings or functions (or uses) 
that are employed by the typologist to express generalizations across languages, as 
illustrated by Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Modality’s semantic map (van der Auwera & Plungian 1998: 91) 
 
Even though semantic-map studies do not always make this fully clear, the meanings or 
functions (or uses) are not intended to correspond to any categories of languages. 
Categories of languages can be mapped onto semantic maps, but there is no claim that 
the categories must be polysemous and that the meanings or uses on the map are 
somehow significant outside of the comparison. 
 When the semantic-functional nodes on semantic maps are not abstract concepts as 
in Figure 1, but reflect concrete utterances, it becomes even more clear that they are not 
linguistic categories, but merely components of a comparative methodology. Examples of 
such concete comparative concepts are visual stimuli, as employed in much recent 
research on semantic typology (e.g. Majid et al. 2007 on cutting and breaking events, 
Evans et al. 2011 on reciprocals), as well as translation contexts, as employed by 
questionnaire-based studies (e.g. Dahl 1985; van der Auwera 1998) and in parallel-text 
typology (e.g. Wälchli & Cysouw 2012; Dahl 2014). In the latter type of studies, each 
translation context represents one comparative concept. For example Figure 2 shows 120 
motion-event contexts from the New Testament studied by Wälchli and arranged by an 
MDS algorithm (according to the method first applied by Croft & Poole 2008). 
Comparative concepts of the type considered in this paragraph are also called “etic grids” 
(Meira & Levinson et al. 2003: 487), using a term originating in anthropology.3 The 
functions or uses of classical semantic maps of the type in Figure 1 have not been called 
“etic”, but I would argue that their status is not any different. As Croft (2016: 3) notes, 
these methods “provide a denser distribution of comparative concepts in particular 
regions of conceptual space”, and the existing cross-linguistic studies have shown that 
“linguistic categorization is even more variable than we believed”.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3 	  The terms “etic” and “emic” from American anthropology (going back to Kenneth Pike) broadly 
correspond to the Hjelmslevian (European structuralist) terms “substance-based” and “structure-based” 
(cf. Boye & Harder 2013). 	  
	   5	  
 
 Figure 2: Motion events studied by Wälchli & Cysouw (2012), and four French verbs 
 
 What all comparative concepts share is that they are defined in substantive terms, i.e. 
making reference to aspects of form or meaning that are independent of the structures of 
particular languages. This allows them to be applied to all languages in the same way, 
using the same criteria for all languages. This point will become important in §7 below. 
 
3. Natural kinds, social categories and observer-made concepts 
 
Describing a new language is somewhat like discovering a new island that has not been 
visited by an explorer before. The language contains a large number of previously unseen 
elements of language structure: More concrete ones such as sounds and words, and more 
abstract ones such as classes of sounds, meanings, and sound-meaning combinations at 
multiple levels of organization. These can be compared to landscape features of the 
newly discovered island, and to the plant and animal species inhabiting the island. The 
explorer will try to bring home pictures of the island’s mountains and streams, as well as 
behavioural descriptions and speciments of the plants and animals, and in modern times, 
she will also make videos that tell others about the new discoveries. Likewise, the 
descriptive linguist will make sound recordings of the language, and bring home a 
dictionary and a grammar containing many new “linguistic species”. 
 When multiple islands are compared by comparative geographers and biogeographers, 
these must find a way of relating all the unique parts and life forms of the islands to each 
other. Now crucially, this is done differently for plants, animals and minerals than for 
mountains and streams. 
 Plants, animals and minerals are NATURAL KINDS, i.e. they are categories which “have 
properties that seem to be independent of our minds” (Dahl 2016: 428). For example, 
the red fox (Vulpes vulpes) is a category of animals that form a group regardless of any 
observers. To talk about them, we need detailed descriptions and agreement on a label, 
but not a definition. If we know enough about red foxes, we can easily recognize them in 
California or China after having first described the species in Europe (or vice versa). The 
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same is true for trees such as the sycamore (Acer pseudoplatanus), found in Spain, 
Belgium or Romania, and for minerals such as gold or quartz.4 
 Mountains and streams, by contrast, are not categories of nature. They are CONCEPTS 
CREATED BY OBSERVERS, and we must learn what they mean from other people. If they 
are to be applied in science, they must be defined rigorously, and delimited from similar 
phenomena (e.g. mountains vs. hills, streams vs. rivers). They are comparative concepts 
of physical geography. Such delimitations are often somewhat arbitrary, so 
terminological uniformity among scholars may require decisions by nomenclature bodies 
(a well-known example is the International Astronomical Union’s 2006 decision to 
define the comparative concept of a planet in such a way that Pluto is no longer 
considered a planet). 
 When exploring a new island, researchers may find completely new plants and 
animals (endemic to the island), but they will not find completely new landscape forms 
to which existing terms (like “mountain” or “stream”) are inapplicable. Geographers may 
feel unhappy with conventional terminology and may propose new ways of cutting up 
the continuum found in nature (just as astronomers changed their minds about planets). 
But such changes in observer-made concepts will not be triggered by any single 
discovery, the way a single new animal species requires a new name. 
 But what about human cultures? Suppose the explorers encounter a new human 
population, with different kinship patterns, poetic forms and house-building styles than 
they are familiar with. How will these be categorized? On the one hand, comparative 
culture scientists work with observer-made concepts. For example, when Botero et al. 
(2014) find that “beliefs in moralizing high gods are more likely in politically complex 
societies that recognize rights to movable property”, they use the observer-made 
concepts “moralizing high god” and “politically complex society”, which have a status 
very much like that of “mountain” or “planet”. These are thus comparative concepts, not 
natural kinds. 
 On the other hand, human cultures and societies also have specific categories that are 
neither natural kinds (in the sense that they recur across continents, independently of 
individual cultures) nor observer-made concepts, but that are recognized by every 
member of the society. For example, Western societies have the categories “boyfriend” (a 
quasi-kinship concept), “poetry slam” (a poetic form), and “office tower” (a house-
building style). These are not universal and did not exist in Western societies as recently 
as 150 years ago, but nowadays they are well-recognized parts of Western culture. I call 
such categories SOCIAL CATEGORIES. What they share with natural kinds is that they are 
pre-established, and there is a causal connection between their members and the 
category. It is not only observers of the Hong Kong skyline that put the buildings in the 
category ‘office tower’ – these buildings were created with precisely this category in 
mind. Similarly, when a man becomes a woman’s boyfriend, he knows in advance what 
social behaviour this category implies. 
 Moving to language, many readers will readily agree that comparative concepts used 
in language typology are observer-made in the same sense as “mountain” or “politically 
complex society”. But what about the descriptive categories that authors of grammars of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Another sort of natural kind is represented by diseases such as tuberculosis which can occur in different 
places at different times, and which can be cured in the same way, regardless of cultural conventions (cf. 
Haspelmath 2015 on the analogy between linguistic categories and diseases). 
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individual languages set up for their descriptions? Aren’t they more like the unique plant 
and animal species that explorers used to find on newly discovered islands? And what 
about individual words or morphemes, such as the word bahi ‘book’ in Odia (an Indic 
language of India)? Here I will argue that language-particular categories are social 
categories, not natural kinds or observer-made concepts (see §6). But before we get 
there, I will discuss the main challenges of language description and comparison (§4), 
and why there is no type-token relation between comparative concepts and descriptive 
categories (§5). 
 
4. The challenges of description and comparison 
 
Linguists often talk about “theoretical approaches” and “linguistic analysis”, but I do not 
find these notions sufficiently clear. It seems to me that all non-applied linguistics is 
theoretical, and that analysis is the same as description (§4.1). Deeper questions often 




Science begins with charting the territory and cataloguing the phenomena, as a 
prerequisite for comparing the data to answer deeper questions. A basic difference 
between the two is that charting should be exhaustive, while asking and answering 
deeper questions is an endless enterprise. 
 In practice, it may be difficult to describe a language fully, but this is a goal that can 
in principle be reached. We do have very comprehensive dictionaries of quite a few 
languages, and the complexity of grammars is not limitless either. Thus, one goal of 
linguistics is to describe all languages in such a way that every regularity is captured. 
This is quite different from comparison of languages, which is necessarily partial, as 
further discussed in §4.2.  
 In addition to listing the words of a language, our descriptions need to make 
reference to abstract categories (such as syllable, construction, inflection class, clause) 
because language use is productive, and speakers can create and understand completely 
novel complex expressions. These categories must strike a balance between elegance and 
comprehensibility. The more abstract the description, the less easy it will be to 
understand it, because it will presuppose understanding many abstract intermediate 
concepts.5 Thus, there is no such thing as the best description,6 but description can be 
more or less comprehensive, and ideally, it would be exhaustive. Van der Auwera & 
Sahoo (2015: 2) are right when they observe that not only comparative concepts, but 
also descriptive categories are “made by linguists”, but the difference is that linguistic 
categories must exist for productive language use to be possible, independently of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For example, Müller (2004) says that the Russian nominal inflectional suffix -o can be characterized by 
the features {[+N],[+α,+β],[–obl]}. This is an elegant description because it requires only four features, 
but it is very hard to understand, because readers need to have an explanation of the features and their 
values first. 6	  It is often said that descriptions should be cognitively realistic (reaching “descriptive adequacy”, in 
Chomsky’s parlance), but it has never been made plausible that any existing descriptions even approach 
this goal, so it is unclear to me how seriously it can be taken. 
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linguists. Different speakers may use different categories, just as different linguists may 
prefer different categories, but categories of some kind must exist. (In contrast, 
comparative concepts do not exist in the absence of comparative linguists.) 
 It is also sometimes said that descriptions should be “typologically informed” (e.g. 
Himmelmann 2016), but it is unclear what exactly this means, beyond the imperative to 
avoid idiosyncratic terminology.7 What is clear, however, is that one cannot describe a 
language well by filling in a questionnaire or checklist. The grammars based on the 
Comrie & Smith (1977) questionnaire are often hard to understand because they do not 
give the authors the opportunity to introduce the basic categories that are crucial for 
understanding the grammatical patterns of the language. It is true that the checklist 
structure ensures comprehensiveness and comparability, but it does not ensure good 
descriptions. 
 
4.2. Comparison  
 
Unlike description of languages, comparison is not a goal in itself. It always serves some 
other goal, such as learning about human language in general, or answering question 
about the historical origin and development of languages. 
 Comparison must be based on comparable phenomena, i.e. phenomena that are 
identified by the same criteria in all languages (sometimes called tertia comparationis). It 
is not sufficient if the phenomena happen to have the same label in different languages. 
This is the same in other disciplines such as geography. We can compare streets, bridges 
and subway lines across cities on the basis of their universally applicable formal and 
functional properties, and probably also main streets and side streets, as well as one-way 
streets and city highways. But it makes no sense to compare streets called “Willy-
Brandt-Straße” across German cities (unless one’s focus is on the history of street 
naming, of course). Thus, we can compare gender systems or causatives across languages 
only if we have a universally applicable definition of the comparative concepts of gender 
and causatives. 
 One of the most interesting results of comparison is implicational universals of the 
type pioneered by Greenberg (1963). In order to formulate testable universals which can 
be replicated and can serve as the basis for a cumulative research agenda, it is particularly 
important that the comparative concepts have clear boundaries. Canonical definitions are 
useful in that they allow us to see how various phenomena relate to each other 
conceptually (cf. Brown et al. 2013), but they do not allow us to test universal (or other 
quantitative) claims, because they do not have clear boundaries.8 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Van der Auwera & Sahoo (2015: 139) say that each language should „be described in its own terms, but 
that does not mean that one should start from ‘categorial’ or ‘conceptual’ scratch each time one sets out to 
describe a new language.” But since each language has its own sets of conventions and linguistic categories 
are defined within the language system (as will be seen in §5), strictly speaking one has to start from 
scratch, although in practice, substantive characterizations of categories will often serve as good starting 
point for further detailed work (see §8). 
8 The same is true of prototypical concepts (cf. Lehmann 2016: §2.2.2), or „vague“ comparative concepts 
(Lander & Arkadiev 2016: §3). With Dryer (2016: 317), I tend to think that the temptation to set up 
concepts with non-clear boundaries in typology arises from the failure to distinguish between comparative 
concepts and language-particular categories. 
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 Unlike description, comparison cannot and need not be exhaustive. There are many 
things that can usefully be compared across languages, but each language also has highly 
idiosyncratic features that cannot be readily compared. Examples from grammar are 
stranded prepositions in English, strong and weak adjectives in German, liaison in 
French, and A-not-A questions in Chinese. Linguists tend to study more general 
phenomena, and they rarely wonder about idiosyncrasies of lexical items and idiomatic 
multi-word expressions, of which every language has many thousands. All these can (and 
ultimately must) be described, but they can hardly be compared across languages. This is 
not a problem, because there may not be anything special to learn about such historically 
accidental phenomena anyway, beyond their complete description. 
 
5. Why there is no type-token relation between comparative concepts and 
descriptive categories 
 
According to Lehmann (2016) and Moravcsik (2016), comparative concepts can simply 
be seen as types of which descriptive categories are tokens: “comparative concepts are 
taxonomically superordinate to descriptive categories” (Moravcsik 2016: 422). 
 In simple cases, and especially where category-like comparative concepts are portable 
(see §8 below), this may seem to be the case. Thus, Moravcsik would say that English 
personal pronouns and Hungarian personal pronouns are tokens of the general category 
“personal pronoun”, and Lehmann says that the Ancient Greek dual is a hyponym of the 
general (“interlingual”) category “dual” (2016: §2.3). 
 However, more generally, this is not the case, because descriptive categories are 
defined in a very different way from comparative concepts: 
 
Language-specific categories are classes of words, morphemes, or larger grammatical units 
that are defined distributionally, that is, by their occurrence in roles in constructions of the 
language. (Croft 2016: 7)9 
 
Comparative concepts, by contrast, are defined in a way that is independent of 
distributions within particular systems. This is a crucial point that is often overlooked. 
 For example, Moravcsik (2016: 420) says that one could ask whether the categories of 
the Latin case system (Nominative, Accusative, etc.) hold for Warlpiri, and that it is an 
empirical question whether the two are commensurable or not. And van der Auwera & 
Sahoo (2015: 3) say that three categories A, B, C from three different languages could 
simply be compared by checking whether they share the features a, b, c, d, etc. But this 
approach cannot work, because categories are defined within particular systems, which 
are different across languages. It makes no sense to ask whether Warlpiri has a Latin 
Accusative because the Latin Accusative is defined with respect to constructions of 
Latin. And when van der Auwera & Sahoo compare demonstratives of a special type in 
English, Dutch and Odia (such, zulk, and emiti/semiti), they do not do so with respect to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 To this I would add that phonemes and other phonological categories, as well as language-specific 
meanings have the same status. 
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the defining features of these items, but with respect to other comparative concepts 
which actually play no role in defining these items.10 
 That comparative concepts are different kind of entities than descriptive categories is 
clearest in the case of etic comparative concepts, especially visual stimuli and translation 
contexts. But category-like comparative concepts are not different in principle. The 
category-like comparative concept “dative” (Haspelmath 2009: §6.1) is defined in the 
familiar substantive way based on universally applicable semantic and formal features,11 
but the meaning of the English preposition to is defined with respect to the structural 
network of constructional meanings in English. Many authors attribute a general “goal” 
meaning to it, and claim that a sentence such as Mary gave the money to John uses the 
Caused-motion construction and thus has a slightly different meaning than Mary gave 
John the money, which uses the Ditransitive construction (e.g. Goldberg 1992). From a 
comparative perspective, one can thus say that English to matches the “dative” concept, 
but one cannot say that it is a token of a general (cross-linguistic) dative category, or 
that it “instantiates” the general category.12 
 That the difference is important can best be seen by controversial cases, such as the 
notion of subject, which has been widely discussed (also in Dryer’s seminal 1997 article). 
From a comparative perspective, it seems best to use the term “subject” as the 
conjunction of the S argument and the A argument (cf. Dixon 1994: 124), because in 
this way, we can ensure the biggest overlap with the existing literature. However, in 
particular languages, definitions of syntactic roles are necessarily rather different. They 
do not make any reference to S, A and P, but rather to constructions such as case-
marking, person indexing and passivization. In Latin and German, for example, one 
could say that a Subject is a nominal argument that is in the Nominative case and 
controls Verb Agreement. Subjects can have various kinds of semantic roles (going far 
beyond typical physical-action verbs, which are the basis of the definition of A and P, as 
well as transitive clauses, Haspelmath 2011a), but these do not define the category. The 
category is defined by case and agreement.  
 The situation in English is different, because case is impoverished and various 
syntactic patterns are quite salient. For example, Subject-to-Object Raising not only 
allows patterns such as (3), but also patterns like (4), where the existential particle there 
is raised. 
 
(3) a. The dog is in the house. 
  b. I believe the dog to be in the house. 
 
(4) a. There are two unicorns in the garden. 
  b. I believe there to be two unicorns in the garden. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In fact, there is no need to define English such, other than by its pronunciation, as van der Auwera & 
Sahoo note themselves (2016: §3.7). 
11 A dative marker is a marker on a nominal that codes the recipient role if this is coded differently from the 
theme role (Haspelmath 2009: §6.1). 
12 Dahl (2016: 429) objects to my earlier arguments against a type-token relation, observing correctly that 
the mere fact that a category in a language has more properties than the comparative concept does not mean 
that there can be no type-token relationship (similarly Lehmann 2016: §2.3). In Haspelmath (2010), I did 
not sufficiently emphasize that categories are defined distributionally within a given language, while 
comparative concepts are defined not distributionally but by their substantive properties. 
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This is commonly taken to be a criterion for Subjecthood in English, for good reasons. 
If we do not use the label Subject for the dog and there in (3)-(4), we need to find some 
other label, and none comes readily to mind. But this also means that agreement is no 
longer relevant to the definition of Subject in English, because the verb are in (4a) does 
not agree with there. In Icelandic, which has much richer case marking, not even case is 
thought to be relevant for the definition of Subject. 
 This well-known example nicely illustrates that in different languages, different 
criteria are used to identify categories that are rather similar semantically (because of 
course the Latin, English and Icelandic “Subject” categories are semantically similar, and 
differ only in atypical cases). But since the categories are not defined by their meanings, 
their nature is different, and they are incommensurable. 
 In such cases of incommensurable definitions, it is nonsensical to use the term 
“subject” as a general term, and to ask, for example, whether the Subject is the 
controller of reflexivization in both Latin and Icelandic. There is no “Subject” concept 
that would work as a descriptive category in diverse languages. 
 Thus, I maintain the view that comparative concepts and descriptive categories are 
not the same kinds of things. But even more important is the point is that we do not 
learn anything about a language 1 by observing that its category A is similar to category 
B in language 2, or by putting both into the same general category C: The general 
category presumption does not work in cross-linguistic studies. This is discussed next. 
 
6. Linguistic categories are not natural kinds but social categories 
 
When I realize that the Spanish noun corazón ‘heart’ belongs to the Feminine gender, 
this gives me additional knowledge about this noun: I can predict that it will occur with 
the indefinite article form una (not un). And when you are told that the Russian verb 
kupit’ ‘buy’ is in the Perfective aspect, you can predict that its Non-Past form will have 
fututre time reference (ja kuplju ‘I will buy’). Thus, language-particular categories help 
predict the behaviour of linguistic forms. In this regard, they are like natural kinds or 
(other) social categories. As we saw in §1 and §3, when told that something can be 
subsumed under a natural kind or a social category, we learn more: When told that a 
drink is made of Camellia sinensis, we can predict its health effects, and when told that a 
man is a woman’s boyfriend, we can predict their behaviour. Similarly, once we realize 
that an animal is a red fox (Vulpes vulpes), we can predict much about it, and if an 
investor is told that a developer wants to build an office tower, they have clear 
expectations. Both natural kinds (like tea, red fox, sycamore) and social categories 
(boyfriend, office tower, epic poem) are categories that are exist in advance, 
independently of the categorization. Realizing that something is subsumed under a 
natural kind or social category is a finding that gives us additional information, and we 
can establish a causal link between the phenomena and the categories. 
 In this respect, natural kinds and social categories are crucially different from 
comparative concepts such as “mountain”, “planet”, or “moralizing high god”. If a 
geographer calls a landscape form on a newly discovered island a “mountain”, this does 
not add any information, and it does not establish a causal link. And the classification by 
a category-like concept such as “mountain” may be regarded as too crude by other 
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observers, to be replaced by more fine-grained comparative concepts such as precise 
contour lines on topographic maps (just as rough classifications into alignment patterns 
based on S, A and P can be replaced by more fine-grained comparative concepts based 
on micro-roles, e.g. Hartmann et al. 2014). Similarly, comparative concepts in economy 
such as “developing country” and “industrialized country” are very crude and are usually 
replaced by more fine-grained measurements. 
 But are categories of particular languages natural kinds or social categories? This 
depends on whether one sees language systems as biological entities or as conventional 
systems.  
 In generative grammar, it is common practice to emphasize the biological foundations 
of language, and it is often assumed that highly specific aspects of language are part of its 
biology, including not only architectural properties of the system, but also substantive 
features (“substantive universals”). 13  In this approach, linguistic categories are thus 
regarded as natural kinds, which means that the same categories are used in different 
languages, just as different languages use the same architectural design for their rules. In 
other words, categories are thought to be cross-linguistic categories (or universally 
available categories, Newmeyer 2007). This means that there is no need to define 
linguistic categories, just as there is no need to define natural kinds such as red fox, or 
gold, or tuberculosis (Zwicky 1985: 284-286). Natural kinds can be recognized by various 
symptoms, which need not be necessary and jointly sufficient, unlike definitional criteria 
(cf. Haspelmath 2015).  
 I regard the generative vision as perfectly coherent,14 but it has not been confirmed 
by research on grammatical patterns over the last century. We have not come up with a 
fixed list of categories (analogous to the periodic table of elements in chemstry, cf. Baker 
2001) that we encounter again and again with exactly the same properties. 
 In practice, when we describe a new language and find a phenomenon that is similar 
to a previously encountered phenomenon from some other language, this is far from the 
end of our study: We still need to look at the whole range of its properties. For 
example, when we discover a construction that has some properties of a passive 
construction, we cannot simply say that it belongs to the natural kind “passive” and leave 
it at that. We need to investigate it in detail, until we have found all its properties in all 
contexts (see, for example, Noonan (1994) on two different passives in Irish, and 
Broadwell & Duncan (2002) on two passives in Kaqchikel). In the end, it does not 
matter what we call the newly found category – we should probably call it “Passive” for 
pedagogical reasons, but by attaching that label to the category, we have not learned 
anything that is not part of our primary description. Thus, I do not see any reason to 
hope that we will ever find a fixed  list of possible categories.15 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 “Substantive universals ... concern the vocabulary for the description of language; formal universals 
involve rather the character of the rules that appear in grammars and the ways in which they can be 
interconnected” (Chomsky 1965: 29). 
14 Dryer (2016: 314) sees it in the same way: „the position that there are crosslinguistic categories is, under 
such a view [i.e. of innate linguistic knowledge], at least coherent ... this is the only coherent way in which 
there might be cross-linguistic categories“.	  
15 PHOIBLE (Moran et al. 2014) contains segment inventories of 1672 languages, and it makes use of 2160 
comparative concepts for segment types. If more languages are added, no doubt more and more segment 
types would have to be included. Many segment types recur across languages, but there is no reason to think 
that there is a biological limit on segment types. The same is apparently true of other types of categories. 
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 Languages have a strong biological basis, but they vary widely across communities, 
i.e. they are systems of social conventions, like social hierarchies, religions, laws, 
currencies, and kinship systems. All of these consist of social categories. In general, 
social categories are definable only within particular systems. Thus, the religious category 
‘angel’ can be defined only within a monotheistic religion of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic 
type; the kinship-like category ‘boyfriend’ can be defined only within a modern Western 
society; the currency Euro depends on its validity on the existence of European Union 
institutions; and so on. All social categories need to be described fully within their frame 
of reference, and we do not learn anything new by linking them to a comparative 
concept. For example, if a religious scholar encounters an angel-like being in a newly 
studied faith, they cannot simply assume that it has all the properties of angels in 
Christianity or Islam; and if a Western comparative legal scholar encounters a divorce 
law in a non-Western society, they cannot simply assume that it has all the properties of 
Western divorce laws (which are of course somewhat variable themselves). 
 The three kinds of scientific concepts that I have discussed here and how they relate 
to concepts in other disciplines are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Social categories, natural kinds and comparative concepts 
discipline social category natural kind comparative concept 
 pre-established category observer-made concept 
 culture-specific universally applicable 
linguistics Spanish Feminine noun, 
Russian Perfective verb 
 ergative alignment, 
epistemic possibility 
religious studies Christian angel, Jewish 
Rabbi 
 moralizing high god 
chemistry  gold, quartz catalyst 
medicine  tuberculosis respiratory disease 
biology  Camellia sinensis, 
Vulpes vulpes 
predator, wing 
astronomy   planet 
geography office tower  mountain, stream 
sociology boyfriend  father, mother, ego 
 
 Thus, linguistic categories are not pre-established natural kinds,16 and there is no way 
around a complete description of phenomena of individual languages. The question then 
arises what the status of category-assignment controversies (Haspelmath 2007) is, e.g. 
why we would want to know whether Chamorro words with meanings like ‘big’ are 
“Class I words” (Topping 1973) or whether they are “adjectives” (Chung 2012). Both 
descriptions are possible, though the first one would seem to be more straightforward 
(as it makes reference to a highly salient feature, the expression of pronoun subjects). So 
why would one insist that a description in terms of “adjectives” is possible and desirable? 
The only reason, it seems, is that it would confirm the hypothesis that all languages have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 I said earlier that „pre-established categories don’t exist“ (Haspelmath 2007), but this was meant to refer 
to cross-linguistic categories. Language-particular linguistic categories are pre-established in the same sense 
as other cultural categories: When a new noun comes to exist in Spanish, it must be Feminine or 
Masculine, i.e. it must be put into one of the pre-established categories. This is analogous to putting people 
into social categories (e.g. when a child is born, it must be assigned to a family in a pre-established role, 
such as natural child, foster child, adopted child). 
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nouns, verbs and adjectives as innate categories, i.e. that these are natural kinds. But this 
hypothesis seems to be based primarily on English, and the alternative hypothesis that 
all languages are like Chamorro in having Class I and Class II words is also confirmed by 
many (and maybe all) languages (Haspelmath 2012). And if Chung’s (2012) deeper study 
of Chamorro had indeed made a discovery of broader significance, we would expect that 
other properties of the relevant Chamorro words would come to light due to their 
identification as adjectives. But this is not the case: The properties of Chamorro 
adjectives are specific properties of Chamorro, not general properties of adjectives in all 
languages. Calling them adjectives does not teach us anything further about Chamorro 
(or about human language), and thinking that it does means to succumb to the general 
category fallacy (see (3) above). 
 
7. Different criteria for different languages 
 
Unfortunately, the general category fallacy is still widespread in linguistics. When there 
is a prominent grammatical term, linguists often assume that it stands for a general 
category that exists independently of the term and of particular languages. Since 
languages differ in the criteria that can be used, linguists resort to different criteria for 
different languages. It is often implicitly assumed that this is an acceptable strategy, and 
sometimes it is also stated explicitly: 
 
(6) a. adjective 
   Dixon (2004: 9): “All languages have a distinguishable adjective class...  
   [which] differs from noun and verb classes in varying ways in different  
   languages, which can make it a more difficult class to recognize.” 
 
  b. word 
   Spencer (2006: 129): “There may be clear criteria for wordhood in  
   individual languages, but we have no clear-cut set of criteria that can be  
   applied to the totality of the world's languages…” 
 
  c. monoclausal pattern 
     Butt (2010: 57): “Whether a given structure is monoclausal or not can  
     only be determined on the basis of language-dependent tests. That is to  
     say, tests for monoclausality may vary across languages, depending on the  
     internal structure and organisation of the language in question.” 
 
d.  NP vs. PP 
  Baker (2015: 13) “[To distinguish NPs and PPs, we should] hope that  
  one can find some fine-grained syntactic properties which distinguish the  
  two kinds...: a process of clefting, perhaps, or quantifier floating – the  
  sorts of syntactic phenomena known to apply to NPs but not to PPs in  
  some languages” 
 
However, using different criteria (or “tests”, or “properties”, or “diagnostics”) for 
different languages makes sense only if we have good reason to think that the 
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phenomenon exists as a universal category (or natural kind) in the first place. In 
generative linguistics, the presupposition that part of our grammatical knowledge is 
innate makes it at least a coherent enterprise to look for such universal categories, but if 
there are no good initial reasons to think that categories like “word” or “PP” are 
universal (other than that they have been used in the grammatical tradition of the last 
few decades and centuries), it is not a promising enterprise. Croft (2009; 2010) has called 
this approach “methodological opportunism”; another term that I have used informally 
is diagnostic-fishing. 
 It seems to me that diagnostic-fishing is one of the biggest obstacles to rigorous 
cross-linguistic comparison, and the sort of replicable and cumulative science of 
language structures that I mentioned at the beginning of this paper. It is for this reason 
that I regard the distinction between language-specific descriptive categories and 
rigorously defined comparative concepts as fundamental for the progress of typological 
linguistics. 
 
8. Portable category-like comparative concepts 
 
Some category-like comparative concepts seem very similar to corresponding descriptive 
categories. For example, the Italian Future tense and the Swahili Future tense are 
similar to each other and one could say not only that they correspond to the comparative 
concept “future tense” of Dahl & Velupillai (2005), but even that “the Italian Future 
tense is a future tense”, i.e. that there is a type-token relationship here. And for 
languages which have two such categories, like English, one could say that “both the will 
Future and the gonna Future instantiate the future tense”. Thus, for these concepts, it is 
possible to see the comparative concepts as categories or classes. The comparative 
concept “future tense” would then be the class (or category) of all tense forms in 
different languages that fulfill the definition. 
 Comparative concepts of this kind are called “portable” by Beck (2016), and there are 
quite a few of them, e.g. those in (7). 
 
(7) personal pronoun, second person, demonstrative, polar question, accusative,  
  instrumental, comitative, future tense, past tense, dual, plural, cardinal numeral,  
  conditional clause, bilabial, velar, fricative, nasal stop 
 
I do not agree with Beck that these are “language-particular terms which are 
comparative concepts”, 17  but clearly, these terms are widely used as category-like 
comparative concepts which do not differ greatly in their definition from the 
corresponding descriptive categories. In many or most circumstances, it does not matter 
much for these concepts whether they are defined substantively like comparative 
concepts, or distributionally like language-particular categories. It seems that those 
linguists who deny or ignore the importance of the distinction between comparative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 But perhaps Beck means this statement as a description of the historical process, in which case I agree. 
Clearly, these terms originated as descriptions of language-particular categories which were transferred to 
other languages without much confusion arising. The resulting comparative concepts are different (see 
below), but the difference is not striking, and may not be noticed much in practice. 
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concepts and descriptive categories mostly have this subset of comparative concepts in 
mind. 
 However, even here it is often important to distinguish between descriptive categories 
and comparative concepts when one considers the phenomena in greater detail. For 
example, the German polite pronoun Sie ‘you’ is semantically a second person pronoun, 
but within the grammar of German, it is a Third Person form that triggers Third Person 
indexing on the verb (e.g. Sie komm-en [you.polite come-3pl] ‘you are coming’). The 
English polite question Would you please open the door? is a Polar Question within in the 
grammar of English (as can be seen from its word order and intonation pattern), but 
functionally, as a speech act, it is not a question but a request. The Finnish Present 
Tense is normally used in future contexts where English requires a special future tense 
form (Dahl & Velupillai 2005), but it would still be strange to say that “the Finnish 
Present Tense instantiates the future tense”.18 
 How does one distinguish between portable and non-portable category labels? I do 
not know any simple answer to this question. Most grammatical category terms from 
the Greco-Latin tradition have been used for other languages, but not all of them have 
given rise to general concepts that can be defined in the same way (using substantive 
concepts) for all languages. Some concepts that do not seem to work for all languages 
are listed in (8). 
 
(8) a. aorist, supine, gerund, middle voice, ablative absolute 
  b. word, clitic, adposition, compound, incorporation, morphology 
  c. inflection, derivation 
  d. finite, converb 
 
The terms in (8a) belong to the more exotic aspects of the classical languages, and only 
middle voice has been used in a typological context, as far as I am aware (but while 
Kemmer (1993) cites many similarities in different languages, she does not provide a 
definition of middle voice with clear boundaries). The unsolved problems with word and 
clitic as comparative concepts are discussed in Haspelmath (2011; 2015), and they carry 
over to other concepts defined in terms of ‘word’, such as adposition, compound, and 
morphology. Sharp boundaries between inflection and derivation are often assumed (e.g. 
when gender is defined in terms of a lexeme concept, which is itself defined in terms of 
the inflection concept), but they do not seem to be definable in a cross-linguistically 
applicable way (cf. Plank 1994). Finally, finiteness is not a useful concept cross-
linguistically, because it combines both person marking and tense marking, which need 
not be absent or present together (cf. Cristofaro 2007).19 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Lehmann (2016: §2.1) says that grammatical category concepts can be multiple hyponyms of other 
grammatical category concepts, but it seems that this is possible only when these are on different levels (as 
with his example of adverbial clauses, which instantiate both „subordinate clause“ and „adverbial modifier“). 
It hardly seems felicitous to say that the Finnish Future tense is both a present tense and a future tense, or 
that the Turkish Dative case is both a dative case and an allative case. For this reason, I have used the verbs 
„correspond to“ and „match“ for the relation between descriptive categories and comparative concepts rather 
than „be“ or „instantiate“. 
19 The term converb is defined in terms of the finiteness concept in Haspelmath (1995) and thus inherits its 
unsolved problems (see also van der Auwera 1998 on the definition of converb). 
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9. Commensurable description of different languages 
 
Moravcsik (2016: 421) asks whether descriptive categories are different for all languages, 
even closely related languages such as French and Italian. And what about dialects, or 
historical stages of a language? “Are relative clauses of Standard Modern English 
categorically different from those of the African-American Vernacular and also from 
those of Middle English?” (Moravcsik 2016: 421). And Dahl (2016: 430) asks a similar 
question: “If we accept that a category varies within one language, why can’t it do so 
across languages?” 
 The answer is that it depends on how we view and describe these languages, as 
different systems, or as variants of a single system. Especially for closely related 
languages, describing them as variants of a single system makes good sense for practical 
purposes. This is what Gil (2016) calls the “unitary commensurable mode” of 
description. Adopting this mode means that the same categories are used, and variation 
is described in an ad hoc way. Thus, for example, we could describe German and 
Modern English relativizers in the same way, as Relative Pronouns, regardless of their 
synchronic status within the system. We would then say that Modern English that is a 
relative pronoun (cf. van der Auwera 1985), like the German relative pronouns, and that 
it just happens to be case-invariant and identical to the complementizer that.20 
 One could extend the unitary commensurable mode to languages even further away, 
and this is of course what has traditionally been done, e.g. when linguists have said that 
the accusative in Swahili is expressed by word order, or the vocative in English is 
identical to the nominative. Such descriptions are now universally thought to be 
cumbersome and ethnocentric, and linguists agree that they do not do justice to the 
languages whose structure is not Latin-like. But such judgements are always somewhat 
subjective, and I do not know how to achieve greater objectiveness in language 
description. As I noted in §4.1, description must primarily be comprehensive, and it 
must include categories which strike a balance between elegance and comprehensibility. 
Uncontroversially, using the same categories for all languages leads to hopelessly 
inelegant descriptions,21 so the issue of incommensurability arises whenever different 
language-specific categories are set up by researchers. Since the well-known European 
languages English, Spanish, French, German and so on are very similar in their 
structure, incommensurability does not raise its head very often, and many linguists 
blissfully ignore it.  
 But when it does arise, as with the question whether Serbo-Croatian adnominal 
demonstratives are adjectives or determiners (cf. Bošković 2009), one needs to be aware 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Another situation where two categories may be known by the same label is when they are cognate but not 
particularly similar anymore. For example, the Modern German Subjunctive mood has almost no functional 
overlap with the English Subjunctive (as in I insist that he come), but both are known by this name because 
they derive from the same Proto-Germanic form. The term subjunctive is not used as a comparative concept 
here, but as a label for a cognate set, like „the *tūn word“, a possible label for the cognate set comprising 
both English town and German Zaun ‚fence’, which derive from Proto-Germanic *tūn. Cognate sets are 
united by common origin, not by any consistent definition. 
21 More precisely, this is uncontroversial outside of generative linguistics. In generative linguistics, not even 
the goal of comprehensive description (§4.1) seems to be shared, let alone the goal of comprehensible 
description. Thus, the hope of finding a set of innate universal categories (as natural kinds) is still held on 
to. 
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that terms like “adjective” and “determiner” are either defined language-internally (in 
which case Bošković’s question is a terminological question), or as comparative concepts 
(in which case Serbo-Croatian adnominal demonstratives would normally be treated as 
adnominal demonstratives, not as adjectives, because the latter are defined semantically, 
with respect to properties such as age, dimension, value and colour). 
 
10. Universal claims pertain not to language structures, but to language 
facts 
 
Dahl (2016: 432) notes that “generalizations presuppose the possibility of making 
statements about individual cases”. Thus, corresponding to the universal in (9a), there 
must be a true language-particular statement as in (9b), and similar statements for all 
languages that have question-word movement. 
 
(9) a. Question-word movement is always to the left. (Haspelmath 2010: 671) 
  b. In Swedish, question-word movement is to the left. 
 
Dahl correctly observes that “if typological generalizations do not involve language-
specific categories, these statements should also be free from such categories”. This may 
sound paradoxical, because (9b) would seem to be a statement about Swedish grammar, 
and the rules of Swedish grammar are supposed to be stated in terms of language-
particular descriptive categories. 
 The paradox is resolved by noting that (9b) is a correct factual statement about the 
Swedish language, but is not a rule of the Swedish language. The corresponding Swedish 
rule says that Question Words are moved to the Prefield Position (i.e. the position 
preceding the Finite Verb), and this rule is of course formulated in structural terms that 
presuppose other descriptive categories of Swedish. 22  The relationship between the 
Swedish rule and the factual statement in (9b) is that the rule makes it straightforwardly 
clear that the factual statement is true, i.e. there is a matching or correspondence 
relationship (but of course note an instantiation relationship). 
 Very similarly, the universal in (10) entails a statement such as (10b). 
 
(10) a. In almost all languages, the subject normally precedes the object  
   when both are nominals. (Greenberg 1963, Universal 1) 
  b. In Mandarin Chinese, the subject normally precedes the object. 
 
LaPolla (2016: §2) objects to the claim that Chinese is an SVO language (which is a 
more specific claim than (10b), but otherwise very similar) because he has shown in 
earlier work that Chinese does not have any subject or object category, and he thinks 
that “labeling [Chinese as an SVO language] implies that these categories either 
determine word order or are determined by it” (cf. LaPolla & Poa 2006). But again, this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 A generativist might try to formulate both the universal in (9b) and the Swedish rule in terms of a cross-
linguistic category (a natural kind, part of innate linguistic knowledge) such as „specifier of C position“. 
Such a view has indeed been popular (and may still be held by many), but there are very few cross-linguistic 
phenomena that support it. In the vast majority of cases, question words are simply fronted, without any 
evidence for a „C“ position (cf. Dryer 2005). 
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is not so. (10b) is a correct factual statement about Mandarin Chinese (assuming that 
“subject” means S/A, and “object” means P), and it is not a rule of Mandarin grammar.23 
LaPolla may be right that “most people who see a description of Chinese as SVO will in 
fact assume that the label was given to the language because those categories are 
significant for determining word order in the language” (2016: 370). But if they do, they 
have not understood the difference between describing a language and classifying a 
language from a comparative perspective. These two are different enterprises – not 
completely unrelated, because both are based on the facts of the language, but also not 
identical. 
 The notion of “factual statement” may be a bit surprising to some readers, because it 
seems not to have played an important role in typology so far. But I would argue that 
implicitly, it has long been there. As part of their grammar-mining activities, typologists 
have generally considered the entire description of a language, not merely the part where 
the author describes a particular category. In many cases, considering the frequency of 
occurrence of a particular form or function is part of this. For example, Dobrushina et 
al. (2005) say that they regard an inflectional form with subjunctive functions as an 
optative if “the expression of the wish is the main function”, which is presumably 
decided by frequency of use. Similarly, Dryer (2005a) distinguishes between dominant 
order and lack of dominant order on the basis of frequency is use. 
 Thus, what we compare across languages is not the grammars (which are 
incommensurable), but the languages at the level at which we encounter them, namely 
in the way speakers use them. This is true not only for word order, but also for cross-
linguistic variation in semantic categorization. Studies based on etic comparative 
concepts such as translation questionnaires, visual stimuli and parallel texts lead to 
groupings of comparative concepts into larger clusters, and to semantic maps or MDS 
plots as seen in Figures 1 and 2 above. These etic concepts typically reflect uses to which 
the categories can be put, not different meanings, and they would not play a role in their 
semantic description. 
 This is again similar to what is practiced in related disciplines: When anthropologists 
compare kinship terms, when political scientists compare political systems, and when 
economists compare economic activities, they must make reference to what happens on 
the ground, rather than to the incommensurable categories of the diverse cultures.24 For 





I conclude that there is a fundamental distinction between language-particular categories 
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23 Confusingly, LaPolla (2016) uses the expression „the facts of the language“ in the sense in which I use 
„rules of the language“ (this strange terminology may be motivated by his rejection of „structuralism“ and 
the competence/performance distinction). 
24 These disciplines can make mistakes as well, of course. For example, comparative economists can make 
the mistake of equating economic activities with legally recorded activities expressed in money values, 
ignoring subsistence and „shadow“ economies of various sorts. Such a failure may lead to a very distorted 
view of economic patterns. 
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descriptions) and comparative concepts (which comparative linguists may use to compare 
languages). Language-particular categories are defined system-internally, by other 
language-particular categories, but comparative concepts are defined substantively, by 
other comparative concepts. The distinction between system-internal categories and 
comparative concepts is found in the same way in other disciplines dealing with social 
and cultural systems, and has been well-known in anthropology by the labels “emic” (for 
system-internal categories) and “etic” (for comparative concepts). I also compare 
linguistic categories with natural kinds, as familiar from biology and chemistry, and I 
argue that they are not natural kinds, because they do not recur across languages with 
identical properties. Thus, it is not licit to use different criteria or symptoms for the 
identification of the same categories across languages. 
 The widespread confusion between language-particular categories and category-like 
comparative concepts seems to derive from the fact that for a significant part of the 
categories (“portable categories”), a characterization in substantive terms gets us fairly far 
(e.g. characterizing nouns in terms of ‘things, persons and places’). As a result, carrying 
over terms from one language to another language based on substantive similarities is 
often possible, sometimes without any serious difficulties. But it is universally recognized 
that ultimately, linguistic categories must be defined in structural terms (with respect to 
other constructions of the language), so the distinction does not disappear. 
 Finally, I noted that on the present view of comparative linguistics, what we compare 
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